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INTRODUCTION: NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE?
After decades of inertia, the United States nuclear energy industry
is poised for a renaissance. President Eisenhower's desire to find a
peaceful counterpart to the terrible destructive power unleashed by
the atomic bomb' and by assurances that nuclear power would
provide energy that was "too cheap to meter" propelled the original
drive toward building nuclear reactors in the 1950s and 60s.2 The first
boom of nuclear reactor construction began in the 1960s and peaked
following the OPEC-induced oil price shocks of the early and mid-
1970s.3 The bottom fell out of the nuclear energy market rapidly
following a retreat due to high oil prices, lower than projected growth
in energy demands, and the 1979 nuclear accident at the Three Mile
4Island reactor in Pennsylvania. Since then, the nuclear energy
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1. See Dwight Eisenhower, President of the United States, Atoms for Peace,
Speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy (Dec. 8, 1953), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20070524054513/http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atoms.htm.
2. See How Nuclear Power Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclearpower/nuclear power-technology/how-nuclear-
power-works.html (last revised Feb. 11, 2003).
3. See id.
4. See id.
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industry has been moribund, with no new reactor construction since
the 1970s.
Today, a new configuration of forces and actors are revitalizing the
prospects for nuclear power generation. For at least a decade, some
have called for increased nuclear power investment as a means to
meet our energy needs and reduce dependence on foreign oil. 6 More
recently, however, new arguments have been added from the
environmental front, which may engender a new round of nuclear
power plant construction.
In his first State of the Union Address, President Obama called for
"building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this
country." 7 One month later, he announced $8.3 billion in loan
guarantees to help fund the construction of two new nuclear reactors
in Georgia, which, if licensed and built, would be the first new
nuclear reactors in the U.S. in nearly thirty years. The Department of
Energy ("DOE") currently has eighteen billion dollars to offer as loan
guarantees to help support a revival of nuclear power plant
construction,9 and in his 2011 budget, President Obama has asked
this amount be tripled to fifty-four billion dollars.10 In addition,
Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, expressed his support for new
nuclear reactor construction during his confirmation hearings, stating
that "the nuclear industry has to be part of our energy mix ... It's 20
percent of our (total). electricity production today, but it's 70 percent
of the carbon-free electricity we produce today.""
5. See id.
6. See Linda Sikkema & Melissa Savage, Nuclear Renaissance?, NAT'L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (March 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/
Energy/StateLegislaturesMagazineNuclearRenaissance/tabid/1 2954/Default.aspx.
7. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in
State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
8. See Julie Schmit, $8.3B in Loans Guaranteed For Nuclear Reactors, USA
TODAY (Feb. 17, 2010, 2:24 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-02-
16-obama-nuclear-power-plantN.htm?csp=obnetwork.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Rosalie Westenskow, Energy Secretary Nominee Supports Clean Coal,
nuclear power, UPI (Jan. 13, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.upi.com/
ScienceNews/Resource-Wars/2009/01/13/Energy-secretary-nominee-supports-
clean-coal-nuclear-power/UPI-79421231889436/.
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It is evident from Chu's statement that concerns about global
climate change and the impact of high carbon emission energy
generation, such as coal-fired power plants, have been a major
impetus for this renewed support for nuclear energy. As the title of
one recent article in the Christian Science Monitor put it, "Global
warming heats up a nuclear energy renaissance."1 2 The article
declared, "Nuclear energy is on the rise in part because of concerns
of fossil-fuel stoked global varming."1 3 This article noted that the
disastrous BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico also contributed to
"rehabilitate nuclear energy in the eyes of the public - and some
environmentalists." 4 Ironically, just as environmentalism played a
key role in derailing the nuclear ambitions of the 1970s,15
environmentalism is now being invoked by nuclear proponents as a
basis for embracing a new generation of nuclear reactors.' 6 It is thus
no surprise that a 2009 Gallup Environment Poll found new high
levels of support for nuclear energy, with fifty-nine percent favoring
its use, including twenty-seven percent who strongly favor it.1
As we are poised to enter a new era of nuclear power plant
construction, it behooves us to revisit the controversies of the past
and consider how best to deal with some of the major problems that
arose once before and may confront us once again. This article will
focus on one particular issue that has not necessarily been in the
spotlight, but nonetheless merits thorough examination and
reconsideration at this critical juncture: how to best allocate the costs
of cancelled nuclear power plant construction projects. These costs
can be substantial, often reaching into the billions of dollars. 8
Following the initial boom of the early 1970s, over 100 nuclear
power plant construction projects were cancelled.' 9 The plant
12. Chuck McCutcheon, Global warming heats up a nuclear energy
renaissance, CHRISTIAN SCI, MONITOR (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Environment/2010/0809/Global-warming-heats-up-a-nuclear-energy-renaissance.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., id.
17. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Support for Nuclear Energy Inches Up to New High,
GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 17025/Support-Nuclear-
Energy-Inches-New-High.aspx.
18. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497,498 (1984).
19. See How Nuclear Power Works, supra, note 2.
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cancellation cases from the 1970s and 1980s are problematic because
of their diverse and sometimes inconsistent results. 20 Developing a
more harmonized approach to the allocation of plant cancellation
costs may help guide us through potential disputes when and if we
proceed down the nuclear road.
Part II of this article will examine the experience of the 1970s and
1980s, when a rash of nuclear power plant cancellations gave rise to
numerous disputes concerning the proper allocation of plant
cancellation costs.21 At the heart of these controversies were
arguments over which were the most appropriate parties to bear the
burden of the cost: utilities, investors, ratepayers, or taxpayers. It
largely fell to state Public Utilities Commissions ("PUCs") to resolve
these disputes. 22 Broadly speaking, these decisions fell into one of
two categories depending on which standard the PUC applied: 1)
allocation of the bulk of cancellation costs to the utility and/or
23investors based on application of the "used and useful" standard, or
2) allocation of the bulk of cancellation costs to the
ratepayers/taxpayers based on application of the "prudent
investment" standard.24 Part II reviews and critiques the logic of
these decisions and considers the lack of consistency across
jurisdictions.
Part III considers the recent initiatives to revitalize the nuclear
power industry and proposes a means to harmonize the "used and
useful" and "prudent investment" standards by pursuing a
foundational analogy to tort concepts of negligence and products
liability. By providing a new and more coherent standard for
approaching the problem of allocating nuclear plant cancellation
costs, Part III lays the groundwork for a more efficient, consistent,
and equitable resolution of controversies involving any future
cancellations of nuclear power plants that may follow upon the
possible coming renaissance in nuclear energy.
20. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 18, at 497-99; Paul Rodgers & Charles D. Gray,
State Commission Treatment of Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 443, 443-50 (1985).
21. See infra p. 9.
22. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 18, at 508-09; Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20,
at 448-50.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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II. THE FIRST COLLAPSE
In 1951, a small Experimental Breeder reactor (EBR-1) in Idaho
became the first nuclear reactor to produce electricity.25 Soon
thereafter, President Eisenhower proposed his "Atoms for Peace"
program, which was aimed at recasting the devastating power of
nuclear energy, as demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in less
threatening terms of civilian electricity production.26 In 1960, Yankee
Rowe, the first fully commercial nuclear power plant opened.27 By
the end of the 1960s, orders were being placed for major nuclear
28
power plants throughout the country. In the early 1970s, forecasts
of steeply increasing demand for electricity, combined with the first
oil price shocks of 1973-74, propelled a major drive toward
expanding commercial nuclear power in the United States.2 9
This expansion proved to be ill-considered and ultimately led to
widespread plant cancellations. 30 Between 1972 and 1990, 120
nuclear power plants were cancelled.31 As early as 1985, the spate of
cancellations had prompted Forbes magazine to call the nuclear
power industry "the largest managerial disaster in business history."32
Unanticipated cost overruns precipitated many cancellations, but
behind the overruns lay an array of factors that conspired to doom the
grand ambitions for nuclear power expansion in the 1970s and 80s. 33
Prominent among these were an increase in energy efficiency,
reduced demand for electricity, and the emergence of strong
grassroots political opposition to nuclear power.34 Most significant,
perhaps, was the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant
that captured the imagination of the nation and led to renewed and
increasingly aggressive regulatory oversight, while deeply eroding
whatever popular support for nuclear energy expansion remained.35
25. See Outline History of Nuclear Energy, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf54.html (last updated June 2010).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Pierce, supra note 18, at 500-02.
30. See How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2.
31. See id.
32. James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at cover.
33. See How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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The resulting nuclear plant cancellations led utilities to flood
regulatory agencies throughout the country with requests for rate
increases to cover the ensuing losses. 36 Consequently, the regulatory
treatment of plant cancellation costs became a source of
controversy.3 7  With billions of dollars at stake, who would
specifically bear the burden of plant cancellation costs was higly
contested. 38
As Paul Rodgers and Charles Gray, (counsels to the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners) noted in a 1985
article, there are typically three options for allocating the costs of
cancelled plants:
First, the commission can allow all the cancellation costs to
be recouped from ratepayers through future rate increases.
Thus, investors are allowed to earn a return on the entire
unamortized balance of the cancellation costs. Taxpayers
also benefit from this cost allocation option since taxes
must be paid on the earned return.
Second, the commission can completely disallow the costs
of the abandoned plant for ratemaking purposes. This
option forces utility investors and taxpayers to absorb the
entire cost. No recovery is allowed from ratepayers. Under
this option, the utility will write off the costs of the
abandoned plant as an extraordinary loss in the year of
cancellation. The share of the costs borne by investors is
The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant
near Middletown, Pa., on March 28, 1979, was the most serious in U.S.
commercial nuclear power plant operating history, even though it led to no
deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community.
But it brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response
planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation
protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also
caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to tighten and heighten
its regulatory oversight. Resultant changes in the nuclear power industry
and at the NRC had the effect of enhancing safety.
OFF. OF PUB. AFF., UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N,
BACKGROUNDER:THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT 2-3 (2009), http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 18, at 505.
37. See, e.g., id. at 497-98.
38. See, e.g., id.
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reduced by the amount of tax savings generated by the
write-off. Thus, under this option, the cancellation costs
are actually shared between investors and taxpayers.
Third, cancellation costs can be shared among all three
groups-ratepayers, investors, and taxpayers. This option
allows only a partial recovery of cancellation costs from
ratepayers. This is the most complex of the cost allocation
methods and has many variations. 39
The most basic principle guiding the allocation of costs derives
from Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., in which
the Supreme Court stated that "the fixing of 'just and reasonable'
rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests." 40 This case addressed the validity of a commission's
ratemaking decision under the Natural Gas Act of 1938.41 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas effectively dealt a death blow
to the rule announced in Smyth v. Ames, an 1898 decision most
closely associated with the doctrine that unfavorable ratemaking can
42
effectively (and unconstitutionally) confiscate utility property. At
the heart of Douglas' opinion, which upheld the stricter regulation of
utility rates, was his finding that, "It is not theory but the impact of
the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot
be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an end." 43
The two standards most commonly used to apply the "justness and
reasonableness" principle of Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., are the "prudent investment" and the "used and
useful" tests. The "prudent investment" test is "the regulatory
analogue to the common law negligence doctrine." 44 Under this
standard, if a decision relating to the construction or operation of a
39. Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 450-5 1.
40. 320 U.S 591, 603 (1944). See Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11,
19 (1950) (holding that the "inclusion in the rate base must meet the test of justness
and reasonableness to the consumer as well as to the investor").
41. See Fed. Power Comm'n, 320 U.S. at 593; see also Wash. Gas Light Co.,
188 F.2d at 18 (discussing conditions under which rate setting by regulatory
agencies might become "confiscatory" and amount to an unconstitutional "taking"
of utility assets without just compensation).
42. See Fed. Power Comm'n, 320 U.S. at 627.
43. Id at 602.
44. Pierce, supra note 18, at 511.
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plant is imprudent based on information reasonably available to the
management at the time, any investment or expense related to that
decision may not be recovered from the ratepayers. 4 5 The "used and
useful" test is based on the principle that ratepayers should provide
investors with a return only on the portion of the utility's investment
that is actually in use generating electricity needed to meet energy
demands. 4 6
These two standards led to very different results in the plant
cancellation cases of the 1970s and 1980s. Generally speaking, the
"prudent investment" test allocated the bulk of plant cancellation
costs to ratepayers by allowing the utility to include most or all of the
costs in its rate base. 47 In contrast, PUCs applying the "used and
useful" test generally disallowed such costs from being included in
the rate base, effectively forcing the utility and investors to bear the
burden of most cancellation costs.48 Unfortunately, as Richard Pierce
noted in his 1984 study of the allocation of nuclear plant cancellation
costs, "the relationship between the prudent investment standard and
the used and useful test has always been vague." 49 One reason for
this is that the prudent investment standard is anachronistic and needs
to be brought up to date.
The "prudent investment" concept emanates from Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion in the 1923 case, Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Missouri Public Service Commission, stating:
The term 'prudent investment' is not used in a critical
sense. There should not be excluded from the finding of
the base, investments which, under ordinary circumstances,
would be deemed reasonable. The term is applied for the
purpose of excluding what might be found to be dishonest
or obviously wasteful or imprudent expenditures. Every
investment may be assumed to have been made in the
45. See id
46. Re Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 339, 368 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n 1982).
47. See Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 449.
48. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 517-23; see also, Rodgers & Gray, supra note
20, at 450.
49. Pierce, supra note 18, at 513.
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exercise of reasonable judgment, unless the contrary is
shown.50
Justice Brandeis articulated what amounts to a version of the
"business judgment rule," which calls for a high level of deference to
be given to corporate decision making by directors.
Specifically, the "business judgment rule" states that "directors are
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of
the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders."51
These duties include the duties of good faith, loyalty, and due care.52
The rule imposes a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by
the directors; 53 a loyal and informed board of director's decisions will
not be overturned by the courts unless those decisions cannot be
"attributed to any rational business purpose."54 Therefore, those
challenging the business judgment of corporate directors (typically
shareholders), have the burden to meet in rebutting this
presumption. 5 The difficulty of overcoming this presumption is
evident in one of the few cases finding a possible breach of business
56judgment, In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, where
the Delaware Chancery Court found allegations sufficient to support
a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty only upon a showing of
facts that the corporate directors failed to exercise any judgment at all
in conducting certain disputed transactions.5 7
As a regulatory analogue to the "business judgment rule," the
"prudent investment" standard places a substantial burden on those
challenging the "prudence" of a particular investment - including
investment in a power plant that was subsequently cancelled. Over
the years this concept has been refined and expanded. Most PUCs
using the "prudent investment" standard applied the test to review
both the initial decision to build a plant, and the on-going decisions
50. 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1 (1924).
51. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
52. See id. at 361.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
57. See id. at 291.
58. See Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 449-50.
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regarding the actual operation of the plant.59 However, the "prudent
investment" test calculus is not the same when applied to these two
types of decisions.
First, consider how the "prudential investment" test is applied to
the initial decision to build a power plant. The initial decision to build
is a matter of financial judgment and expert forecasting of future
electrical demands. 60 Applying the "prudent investment" test to this
type of decision requires a substantive analysis of the decision's
reasonableness at the time it was made.61 Commissions are extremely
reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the utilities in these
62
situations.
Next, consider how the "prudential investment" test is applied to
the ongoing decisions regarding plant operation. Subsequent
decisions regarding the ongoing plant management and cancellation
timing are more procedural in nature in that "prudence" becomes a
measure of on-going administrative performance and efficiency.63
Here commissions are far more willing to step in and disallow
recovery of costs due to "imprudence." 64
Both substantive and procedural prudence involve the same
common law negligence standard of reasonableness, but the burden
of proof placed on opponents of rate increases under substantive
prudence is far greater. Generally, utility investments and
expenditures are presumed to be prudent.65 Therefore, "in order to
succeed, any attempt to establish the imprudence of a utility's
decision to construct a new plant would require extraordinarily large
expenditures for the services of lawyers, economists and
engineers."66
59. See, e.g., Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pa. P.U.C., 433 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1981).
60. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 502, 511-12, 517.
61. See, e.g., id. at 511 (describing the ways a utility's investment decision may
be found imprudent).
62. See, e.g., id. at 517 (discussing why a commission may be reluctant to
disallow inclusion of a plant's investment in the rate base).
63. See, e.g., id. at 511; see also, Re Consumers Power Co., 14 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR 4th) 1, 18 (Mich. P.U.C. 1976); Re Kan. Power & Light Co., 38 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR 4th) 1, 13-14 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980).
64. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 511, 512.
65. See id., at 511; see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S
591, 602 (1944).
66. Pierce, supra note 18, at 512.
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A finding of procedural imprudence is easier. It involves relatively
simple comparisons to on-going industry-wide standards, whereas
substantive review involves an examination of the specific facts
underlying a particular decision to build. 67 Thus, in Re Boston
Edison Co., the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, while
finding the initial decision to build a subsequently cancelled plant to
be prudent, nonetheless also found that the management's decision to
delay the cancellation was imprudent and therefore denied recovery
of costs incurred by reason of the delay.68
The "used and useful" test is more straightforward than the
"prudent investment" test. Commissions prefer the "prudent
investment" standard because it comports with common sense and
requires less expert knowledge. 69 PUCs find it helpful in how to deal
with excess electricity generating capacity in operating plants." For
example, in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission, the state court upheld a PUC's disallowance of
$25,040,000 from a utilities claimed rate base where the Commission
found that the utility had 775 megawatts of excess capacity which
was not used and useful. 7 Here the "used and useful" test allowed
the PUC to go beyond considering single plants (each of which was
individually used and useful) to consider the utility's "generating
properties" as a whole. 72 This led to a finding of overall excess
generating capacity. 73 The PUC then removed from the rate base the
least economical generating units as representative of that excess.74
Thus, the "used and useful" test provided a means to penalize
inefficient business practices while still allowing a return on
investment for efficient practices.
The use of the "used and useful" test, however, is far more
problematic in the case of cancelled plants. Here the PUCs are very
reluctant to carry the test to its logical conclusion and exclude all
67. See, e.g., Re Bos. Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 431, 470 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
68. See id.
69. Pierce, supra note 18, at 511-12.
70. See, e.g., Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pa. P.U.C., 433 A.2d 620, 622-23 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1981).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 623.
73. See id. at 622-24.
74. See id. at 622.
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costs associated with cancelled plants which clearly are not used and
useful. Rather, most commissions will divide the costs between the
utility and the consumers, allowing the recovery of but no return on
investment. 75  The "prudent investment" test acts as a means to
rationalize this seemingly inconsistent application of the "used and
useful" test.
Thus, in assessing what rate of return is allowed when Virginia
Electric & Power Company (VEPCO) cancelled two plants, Surry 3
and Surry 4, the Virginia State Corporation Commission found that:
Surry 3 and 4 were never used and useful to the ratepayers
and, after the cancellation of the project, there is no hope or
promise that they will ever be used or useful. Under these
circumstances equity demands that VEPCO's investors
must accept some of the risk of Surry 3 and 4 be forfeiture
of any claim to an expected return on this investment.
The commission finds expenditures associated with Surry 3
and 4 were reasonably and prudently incurred.
Accordingly, the commission authorizes [a recovery of, but
76
no return on these expenditures].
Here the "prudent investment" and "used and useful" tests are used
to limit the other. All decisions associated with the plant appear to
have been prudent, but none of the investment in the plant ever
became used and useful. The commission chose to allow a return of
investment because the substantive decision to build the plant in the
first place was prudent even though the plant never became used and
useful. 77 But the commission disallowed a return on the investment
because it never became used and useful, even though all ongoing
management decisions were apparently procedurally prudent. Alone,
the "used and useful" test would disallow any recovery at all. Alone,
the "prudent investment" test would allow both recovery of and
return on investment. Together, they allow the court to reach what it
considers to be an equitable compromise.
75. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 18, at 518-19; Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20,
at 443-45, 449-5 1.
76. Re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 65, 81 (Va. Corp.
Comm'n 1979) (alteration in original).
77. See id.
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This seems to be a logical outgrowth of the equitable principles of
Hope Natural Gas Co. 78 The commission weighed the interests of
consumers and investors and allocated costs accordingly. 79 This is the
most common approach taken by state PUCs in treating cancellation
costs.8 0 And so, we have the Pennsylvania PUC refer to the used and
useful test as a "flexible rate-making tool" to be applied on a case by
case basis.8 1
One concern with this approach is not that it necessarily arrives at
the "wrong" result, but that it dilutes the substance of each test and
fails to justify why this "return of but not on" investment formula is
equitable. The result is a tendency among commissions to use the
tests merely as tools to rationalize decisions rather than as principle
to guide them. What does usefulness have to do with risk? Why
should prudence override the used and useful test? What is equitable
about the mixed application of these two tests? These and similar
questions were never adequately addressed by most PUCs.
A few commissions shared these concerns and have implicitly
rejected the Virginia commission's reasoning in Virginia Electric &
Power Co. In Re Pacific Power & Lighting Co., the Montana PUC
disallowed recovery from ratepayers of investments in two
terminated nuclear plants. 82 This decision, however, was based on a
state statute that explicitly disallowed rate base treatment for property
not used and useful in providing utility service and which the
commission held also barred any inclusion in the cost of service of
the amortized investment in the plants.83 Because of this statute, the
commission felt no need to temper its application of the "used and
useful" test with regards to the concept of prudence. 84 Indiana had a
similar statute which its courts have held to bar recovery of
"extraordinary costs" occasioned by the "prudent cancellation" of a
78. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S 591, 603 (1944).
79. See id.
80. See e.g., Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 503
(Me. P.U.C. 1982); Re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) at
327; see also Pierce, supra note 18, at 518-519.
81. See Pa. P.U.C. v. Metro. Edison Co., 37 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 77, 85,
86 (Pa. P.U.C. 1980).
82. See Re Pac. Power & Light Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 24, 31 (Mont.
P.U.C. 1983).
83. See id at 27.
84. See id. at 28.
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plant because it provided no "service" to the ratepayers.8 5  Again,
prudence was disregarded as secondary to usefulness.
These cases remain something of an anomaly because of the
presence of a statute explicitly addressing the issue of cost allocation.
Their reasoning may be clear and straightforward but it is of little
help in resolving disputes in jurisdictions without such statutes. In
particular, the statutes settle issues of allocation of risk. The
commission need not justify its decision beyond an appeal to
statutory law. As a result, the questions raised by decisions such as
Virginia Electric, remain unaddressed.
Two other cases provide somewhat more satisfactory analyses of
cost allocation but also remain anomalous because they also involve
unique jurisdictional issues. In Re Northern States Power Co., the
Minnesota commission both allowed and disallowed cancellation
costs resF ectively for abandoned in-and out-of-state generating
facilities. The commission disallowed recovery of cancellation costs
for the out-of-state facility because "the cancellation was of no
benefit to Minnesota ratepayers, and [found] that those ratepayers and
their needs were not an element of the cancellation decision."87 Here
"benefit" was the basis for allocation of costs. 8 The commission's
prime concern was to protect Minnesota ratepayers from the effect of
out-of-state losses. 89 To this extent, the commission's reasoning
seems to provide a common law analogy to the Indiana and Montana
commissions' extension of the used and useful test to exclude all
cancellation costs. The Northern States commission, however, did
85. Citizens Action Coal of Ind. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 613-
15 (Ind. 1985) (discussing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-2-1, 8-1-2-4 (West Supp. 1985).
(providing that, inter alia:
The charge made by any public utility for any service rendered or to be
rendered either directly or in connection therewith shall be reasonable and
just.', and: 'The commission shall value all property of every public utility
actually used and useful for the convenience of the public at its fair
value... IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-6(a) (West 1982)).
86. See Re N. States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 339, 339 (Minn.
P.U.C. 1981).
87. Id. at 362.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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allow recovery of costs for in-state cancellations when the plant was
"prudently commenced and prudently abandoned." 90
Regarding state plants, then, the Minnesota decision seems to echo
those of Virginia Electric.91 The only difference between the two
cases is that in Northern States, the Minnesota commission had a
parochial state interest in protecting its ratepayers. 92 But the
Minnesota commission did take one very important step beyond
those other cases. In justifying its disallowance of out-of-state
cancellation costs, the commission stated that the "owners control
their companies and assume the risks of ownership by investing.
Minnesota ratepayers cannot be asked to insulate to the owners from
all financial risks." 93  This reasoning introduces important
considerations regarding risk allocation. Minnesota found it
unreasonable for its ratepayers to assume the risk for out-of-state
plants. 94 By the same token, it found it reasonable for Minnesota
ratepayers to assume the risk for a prudent in-state plant.95 Prudence
and the idea of reasonableness were inextricably bound to the idea of
assumption of risk. One might interpret the Minnesota commission
as saying that it was reasonable for its ratepayers to assume the risk
for a prudently planned plant. But because an out-of-state plant does
not consider ratepayers' needs and are not subject to ratepayers'
influence, an out-of-state plant cannot be prudently planned with
respect to their interests. Hence, they assumed no risk for its
cancellation.
Re Arizona Public Service Co. reflects similar reasoning.96 Here,
utilities in Arizona and California joined to build a nuclear plant. 97
When the California utilities withdrew, the project was cancelled. 98
90. Id. at 363.
91. See Re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 65, 81 (Va.
Corp. Comm'n 1979).
92. See Re N. States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. at 362.
93. Id. at 362.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 362-63.
96. See Re Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 547, 556 (Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n 1980).
97. See id. at 556 (suggesting that California utilities participated in the Palo
Verde project).
98. See id. (indicating that the cancellation was a result of adverse regulatory
conditions in California that rendered the California's continued participation
uncertain).
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The Arizona utility attempted to recover its investment in the plant
through a multi-year amortization.99 The Arizona commission
disallowed recovery of any of the expenses because: 1) there was
insufficient evidence justifying the expense, 2) the expense was
unusual and non-recurring, 3) construction planning decisions were
within the control of stockholders and should not be paid for by
ratepayers, and 4) the cancellation decision was primarily due to
adverse regulatory conditions in California.100 Thus, the commission
concluded that the utility must look to other participating utilities or
to its own stockholders to recover any expense associated with the
cancellation. 101 The commission further emphasized that "prudent
utility management should have negotiated appropriate contractual
provisions [with the co-sponsoring California utilities] to guard
against and/or recover for such a contingency." 102 As in Northern
States, the Arizona commission's prime concern was to protect its
ratepayers from the consequences of actions taken by out-of-state
entities.103
Prudence and allocation of risk (rather than the "used and useful"
test) underlay each of the commissions' four reasons for denying
recovery of costs. First, the Arizona commission denied recovery
because of insufficient evidence justifying the expense.104 This
reason is clearly related to the "prudent investment" test, which
requires that initial decisions to build plants be based on a reasonable
assessment of projected energy needs and costs.o105 What is critical
here is that the commissions put the burden on the utility to justify its
expense whereas most commissions assumed prudence.' 06 This
shifted a greater amount of risk to the utility. The Arizona
commission's second justification was that the expense was unusual
and non-recurring. 0 7 This reason relates to the allocation of risk
itself; that is, the more extraordinary an event, the less reasonable it
99. See id. at 555.
100. See id. at 556.
101. See Re Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR
4th) 547, 556 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 509, 511.
106. See Re Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) at 556.
107. See id.
[VOL. XXII
PR UDENT INVESTMENT STANDARD
was to expect someone to assume the risk of its occurrence. The third
and fourth reasons mirrored those presented in Northern States
regarding control and jurisdiction and were resolved in much the
same manner. 0 8  The commission's emphasis on "contractual
provisions" further implies that the utility assumed the risk for its
imprudent failure to make such provisions.
Northern States and Arizona Public, however, fall short of a full
and independent application of the concepts of prudence and
assumption of risk to the allocation of cancellations costs. Both cases
depend on the underlying jurisdictional issues to give them force.
Both decisions also fail to take the next logical step and apply the
same concepts to in-state plants.
At least two commissions confronted this next step and arrived at
opposite results. In Re Potomac Electric Power Co., the District of
Columbia commission arrived at an allocation of costs similar to that
of Virginia Electric, allowing a recovery of, but no return on,
investment.109 In the course of its opinion, however, the commission
paid greater attention to the implications of the "prudent investment"
test. The D.C. circuit distinguished Arizona Public, noting that in that
case, the commission found "imprudence" in "a plant cancellation
which was the result of another jurisdiction's regulatory policies,
rather than the action of the utilities at all."'o The D.C. commission,
strongly disapproved and, stated that "this reasoning tends to hold the
utility absolutely liable for any plant cancellation," and concluded
that, "[w]e cannot find that [the utility] made an imprudent decision
with respect to [its abandoned plant]. To disallow amortization of the
project loss would be to apply a standard - not of reasonable
prudence, but - of absolute stockholder liability for plant
cancellations. We decline to accept this standard.""' The D.C.
commission explicitly rejected applying strict liability to utility
management as antithetical to the standard of prudence.112
But just as the theory of negligence evolved into strict liability, so
too, should the theory of prudence evolve into strict stockholder
108. See id.
109. See Re Potomac Elec. Power Co. 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 500, 533-35
(D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982).
110. See id. at 535.
111. Id.
112. See id at 535-36.
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liability." 3  A power plant and the electricity it generates are
essentially products provided to ratepayers. If a plant is cancelled it
is, in effect, defective. The substantive decision to build the plant,
and perhaps the subsequent procedural management, must be
considered similarly defective. If so, then the burden of disproving
defectiveness and/or imprudence would lie with the utility. Investors
would remain protected to the extent that egregious mismanagement
gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the utility
managers. It is here, in a fiduciary liability suit, and not in a rate
dispute, that the prudence standard associated with the business
judgment rule should apply.
In Re Union Electric Co., the Missouri Public Service Commission
applied strict liability to plant cancellations.'1 4  In denying the
recovery of cancellation costs, the commission retained the
traditional "prudent investment" test as a "threshold" for allowing
recovery but went on to assert that,
There are operating expenses which are not allowed even
though they may be said to be prudently incurred. The
disallowance of the operating expenditures is based upon
the finding that they were not made for the benefit of the
ratepayer. Thus, even for normal operating expenses
prudence is not the only criterion for recovery. Since
cancellation costs are not normal operating expenses, they
should be. even more closely scrutinized to determine if
they should be recovered."'
The distinction between normal and extraordinary expenses echoes
the distinction between substantive and procedural prudence. While
the above reference to "benefit" may make the decision appear to be
a simple derivation of the "used and useful" test, the commission
actually used the concepts of "benefit" and "prudence" to shape a
113. The literature on the development of negligence is vast. For a classic
discussion of the emergence of strict liability of negligence, see William L. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L. J. 1099,
1104 (1960).
114. See Re Union Elec. Co., 74 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 80, 93 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986).
115. Id. at 90-91.
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theory of allocation of risk which approaches strict liability."
Arguing that the reasonable investor examines potential risks and
benefits before buying stock in a utility, the commission found that,
Part of the potential risk is that the plant may not be
completed and therefore all or a portion of the investment
may not be recovered through rates.
It can be seen from this analysis that the initial risk of
cancellation is borne by the investor stockholder. If this
were not true and a stockholder could be assured a return of
his investment whether the plant was cancelled or not, it
would make the investment practically risk free." 7
This reasoning effectively shifts prudence from being a measure of
managerial competence to a guide to allocating risk. The prudent
stockholder knowingly assumed the risk of cancellation - the
ratepayer had no such choice. It would be unreasonable to place the
burden of risk on a party who had no control or choice rather than on
one who did.
The commission stopped short of an explicit finding of strict
liability by retaining a commitment to the equitable balancing of the
interests of all parties involved.' Nonetheless, by placing the new
opinion in the context of recent developments in the theory of
negligence in tort law, it is possible to craft an interpretation of the
prudent investment standard which would merge into strict liability.
The Missouri commission approached this sort of reasoning but did
not enunciate an underlying rationale for its conclusion.1 9 If we now
look at Union Electric in light of the rationales for strict product
liability listed above, some compelling insights emerge. The first
rationale for strict product liability is fundamentally one of allocation
of risk.120 A utility, just like a manufacturer, is in a far better position
to estimate the risks of its operations than a consumer. The primary
issue here is one of control. Utilities and their stockholders control
116. See id.
117. Id. at 91.
118. See id.
119. See id
120. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d. 57, 63 (Ca. 1963);
see also, DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 254, 258 (Thomson/West 2d
ed., 2005).
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the decision making process. 12 Ratepayers have no input. 122 Lack of
ratepayer control was one of the primary reasons that the Arizona and
Minnesota commissions denied recovery of cancellation costs for
out-of-state plants.123 Missouri took this one step further and applied
the concept to in-state plants and linked control to assumption of risk:
the utility and the investors assessed the risks and made the decision
to build or invest. 124 The utilities and the investors had control over
the situation and the ratepayers had no such control; they had to
accept the product as is.125 It follows that it is unreasonable or
"imprudent" to expect ratepayers to insure investments over which
they exercised no control; thus, those who had control should assume
the risk.126
The second rationale also relates to control in the sense that only
those with access to vast amounts of information can ever prove
substantive imprudence.127 Therefore, indirectly addressing this
problem, the Missouri commission shifted the burden of proof to the
utility to justify cancellation costs because they were not associated
with used and useful (or non-defective) property. 128 One might say
that cancellation is presumptive evidence of imprudence or a
"defective product." Note that procedural imprudence is much easier
to prove and more clearly related to conduct than to the "marketing"
of a "product;" hence, here, as in stockholder fiduciary liability suits,
a more traditional standard of prudence would still be relevant.129
121. See Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 461-62.
122. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the decision in Re Pac. Power & Light Co., 53
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 24 (Mont. P.U.C. 1983) was based the commission's
view that ratepayers should not have to pay for bad decisions they had no part in
making).
123. See Re Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 547, 556 (Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n 1980); Re N. States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 339,
362 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981).
124. See Re Union Elec. Co., 74 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 80, 91, 93 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986).
125. See id. (discussing how the investor stockholder bears the initial risk of
cancellation).
126. See Id. at 93.
127. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 512.
128. See Union Elec. Co., 74 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) at 89.
129. See, e.g. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360-61 (Del.
1993).
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Finally, in regard to incentive, allowing utilities to recover their
investments effectively forces ratepayers to insure stockholders.
Putting this burden on ratepayers will in no way change their
behavior because they have no control over the situation in the first
place. Putting the burden on the stockholders, however, at least has
the potential of encouraging more responsible behavior on the part of
utility management.
What is so revealing about the D.C. commission's in Potomac
Electric is that it explicitly addresses the issue of strict liability and
its relation to the standard of prudence. 130 The commission rejected
strict liability outright as unreasonable, but implicitly recognized that
the cancelled plant was, in effect, a defective "product," whose
purchase price the utility was trying to pass off onto ratepayers.131
Potomac Electric assumed that strict liability and prudence are
mutually exclusive. Indeed, if one assumes the standard of prudence
to be the common law analogue of negligence enunciated by
Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission,132 one finds it to be incompatible with
current notions of strict liability. However, over the past sixty years
the theory of negligence in tort has developed by leaps and bounds. 13 3
The D.C. commission, even as it spoke in terms of modem strict
liability, seemed oblivious to this development.' 34
If we consider how tort theories of negligence and products
liability have evolved since the 1920s-when Brandeis first
enunciated the prudent investment standard-it may be possible to
elaborate a new standard for evaluating the allocation of plant
cancellation costs that harmonizes the concepts underlying both the
"prudent investment" and "used and useful" standards.
130. Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 500, 535 (D.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982).
131. See id.
132. See Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
289 n.l (1924).
133. See generally OWEN, supra note 120, at 250-80.
134. See Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) at 533-35.
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III. HARMONIZING THE STANDARDS: BRINGING "PRUDENCE" UP TO
DATE
This section will discuss the analogy of the prudent investment
standard to products liability. First, though, it is important to bear in
mind that this is an analogy, not an argument for direct
correspondence. Rather, the analogy provides guidance on how best
to update the prudent investment standard and bring it into harmony
with the "used and useful" test. Products liability is a particularly apt
source of analogy because, as David Owen has remarked,
Products liability law is full of mixtures. It is a mixture of
tort law - negligence, strict liability in tort, and deceit - and
of the contract law of sales - mostly warranty. It is a
mixture of common law, now mostly on its tort side, and
statutory law, generally on the contract side - notably sales
law under the Uniform Commercial Code. 13 5
As such it is well suited to casting light on the peculiarly hybrid
nature of the relation between utilities and ratepayers.
Because utilities are regulated monopolies, electricity, the product
they supply, is inescapably connected with its price. Under the
regulatory bargain that allows the utility to function as a monopoly,
ratepayers are not simply buying electricity; they are buying
electricity at a reasonable price.136 Ratepayers have no direct control
over price and no alternative source for the product, so the price, in
effect, becomes part of the product they are forced to buy. 137 When a
plant is cancelled and the utility seeks to have the costs of
cancellation allocated to ratepayers through their inclusion in its rate
base, the utility is causing economic hardship to the ratepayer.138 The
source of this hardship is the cancelled plant - a product, if you will.
As Richard Pierce notes, "[u]nlike the prudent investment test, the
used and useful test does not make the finding of fault a prerequisite
for the exclusion of an asset from [the] rate base."l 39  Liability
without fault directly calls to mind the concepts underlying strict
135. OWEN, supra note 120, at 4.
136. See Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 446.
137. See id.
138. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 505, 506.
139. Pierce, supra note 18, at 513 (alteration in original).
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products liability. Prudence, in contrast, derives from early twentieth
century understandings of negligence. 14 0 If we update the concept of
prudence to reflect updates in concepts of negligence as applied to
products liability, we may be able to bring the prudent investment test
into closer alignment with the used and useful test, providing rules of
greater clarity and consistency for resolving future plant cancellation
disputes.
The "used and useful" test is largely functional and empirical. The
test asks whether the costs sought to be included in the rate base are
directly related to the active production and supply of a product; in
this case, electricity to the ratepayers. 14 1 In contrast, the prudent
investment standard is more evaluative and normative; it examines
whether particular business decisions were reasonable under the
circumstances and considers the propriety of allocating costs related
to actions judged to be reasonable. 142 Given both the practical and
conceptual differences underlying these tests, it is not surprising that
they tend to lead to very different results. Such variability can cause
uncertainty and instability in regulated markets for electricity.143
Rather than simply arguing for one standard or another to take
preeminence, I propose a means to update the prudent investment
standard in a manner that retains its doctrinal roots while bringing it
into harmony with the used and useful standard.
The no-fault aspect of the "used and useful" test is rooted not only
in an empirical evaluation of a plant's functional capabilities, but also
informed by a normative evaluation of the fairness of charging
ratepayers for unused utility assets. Thus, for example, in In re
Pacific Power & Light Co,14 4 the Montana Public Service
Commission relied on general concepts of fairness in focusing on the
argument that "that ratepayers should not pay for a bad decision
when they had no part in making that decision and that a utility's
investment should not be made risk free by allowing them to recover
that investment even when it does not produce."l 45 Such evaluative
considerations of the equities of allocating cost and risk indicate that
140. See generally OWEN, supra note 120, at 250-58.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
144. 53 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 24 (Mont. P.U.C. 1983).
145. Id. at 27.
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there may be more in common between the used and useful and
prudent investment tests than first meets the eye.
As stated above, the prudent investment standard is an analogue of
negligence.146 The traditional common law formula for establishing
negligence involves finding a breach of a duty or obligation,
recognized by law, requiring the person to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk.147 The standard required is generally that of a reasonable person
under the same or similar circumstances. 14 8 This is essentially the
standard adopted by Brandeis in Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,149 and it
remains the standard used today in judging the actions of utility
management under the prudent investment standard.15 0 However, this
standard has merged with the business judgment rule to create a
nearly insurmountable barrier to ratepayers who would challenge the
inclusion of plant cancellation costs in a utility's rate base.15 '
Each of these rules as applied in the plant cancellation cases is
inapt for the following reasons: first, the business judgment rule was
developed largely to shield corporate directors from shareholder
lawsuits second-guessing business decisions.' 52  Ratepayers,
however, are not investors. They have no direct interest in the utility
and, more specifically, they have no choice regarding their
involvement with the utility.153 As Rodgers and Gray note, one PUC,
146. See supra text accompanying note 44.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
148. Id. § 283.
149. 262 U.S. 276, 289 & n. 1 (1923).
150. See, e.g., Cal. P.U.C., Div. of Water & Audits [CPUC], Fulton Water
Company Inc. (FWC) Order Authorizing a Ratebase Offset Revenue Increase,
Producing an Increase in Gross Annual Revenue of $61,548 or 9.41% to Current
Approved Gross Revenues, at *2, Res. W-4846 (Oct. 28, 2010) (finding that
increases in rates due to plant additions were authorized because the additions were
prudent investments and rates were just and reasonable); In re N.Y Water Serv.
Co., No. 07-W-0463, 2009 WL 3722045, at *1 (N.Y.P.S.C. Oct. 15, 2009)
("Ratepayers . .. should not be held responsible for making up the shortfall in fund
earnings cased by management's less than prudent investment strategy."). See also
73B C.J.S. Public Utilities, § 44 (2010); Pierce, supra note 18, at 511.
151. Pierce, supra note 18, at 517.
152. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360-61 (Del. 1993).
153. See infra text accompanying note 157.
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applying the "used and useful" test in 1983, justified its allocation of
costs to investors instead of ratepayers because of the:
[G]eneral fairness concept that ratepayers should not be
forced to pay for a bad decision when they had no part in
making it. Indeed, the Commission openly stated that the
risks of investment must be borne by the shareholder
because it is he, through the management he selects, who
decides which projects will be pursued. The Commission
further stated that to expect the ratepayer to compensate the
shareholder for company losses is to guarantee recovery of
shareholder investments.154
Interestingly, in this case, the PUC applied the empirical "used and
useful" test but also seems to have informed its application of the test
with the more evaluative approach of the prudent investment
standard. Here, perhaps is the first opening for harmonizing the two
approaches: the evaluative considerations of the prudent investment
standard should recognize that the business judgment rule, while
appropriate for resolving disputes between investors and utility
directors, should not be applied in disputes between ratepayers and
utilities concerning the allocation of plant cancellation costs.
A second opening to harmonizing the two approaches may be
found by reconsidering the nature of the concept of negligence
underlying the prudent investment standard. Once we recognize that
the concept of negligence, as related to business judgment, is an
improper concept for governing relations between utilities and
ratepayers, the argument can be made that a more appropriate
standard may be found in the concept of negligence as related to
products liability. Utilities, generally speaking, are regulated
monopolies.155 Ratepayers have no real choice concerning the
purchase of electricity - their contracts with utilities are essentially
contracts of adhesion.156 When utilities decide to build a new nuclear
154. Rodgers & Gray, supra note 20, at 461-62 (discussing the general fairness
concept found in Re Pac. Power & Light Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR 4th) 24
(Mont. P.U.C. 1983)).
155. See Joseph Tomain, Nuclear Regulation in Transition, 17 PROGRESS IN
NUCLEAR ENERGY 245, 257 (1986).
156. Id. at 257-58.
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power plant and fold its costs into the rate base, they charge
consumers not only for electricity, but also for the plant itself.'57
That is, the utilities are not simply selling electricity as the sole
product; they are selling electricity and also the plant that generates
it. When a plant is cancelled, allocating its costs to ratepayers causes
them economic hardship. Under these circumstances, the plant is, in
effect, a defective product with the capacity to cause economic harm.
Just as Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri drew on an
analogy to common law concepts of negligence to articulate a
prudent investment standard,"8 it is now appropriate to analogize to
recent developments in negligence law, and specifically to the law of
products liability to update the prudent investment standard.
One hurdle may be the "economic loss rule;" under which
consumers cannot recover damages in negligence or products liability
for purely economic harm.' 5 9 Nonetheless, many courts have carved
out exceptions to the economic loss rule, where there is a special
relationship between the parties.160 For example, in the case of J'aire
Corp. v. Gregory,161 the court found a "special relationship" between
a lessee and a contractor sufficient to support a claim for economic
losses due to negligence.162 In this instance, the basis for the special
relationship was the injury's foreseeability, both in scope and in
terms of the potential parties affected. 163 Alternatively, the
relationship between a utility and its ratepayers is far more specific
than that in J'aire Corp. Utilities and ratepayers are in privity of
contract because ratepayers buy a product directly from the utility. 164
The foreseeability of economic harm to ratepayers resulting from an
ill-conceived and subsequently cancelled nuclear power plant is self-
evident. The question then becomes, what makes a design to build
and/or cancel a plant ill-conceived? This is where consideration of
157. See id. at 258 (discussing ratepayers as cost-bearers of nuclear plants).
158. 262 U.S. 276, 290-91 (1923).
159. William Powers, Jr. & Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and
the "Economic Loss" Rule, 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 477, 480 (1992); See also
Richard W. Wright, The Principles ofProduct Liability, 26 REV. LrrIG. 1067, 1072
(2007).
160. J'aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979).
161. Id.
162. Id at 62-63.
163. Id. at 63.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 170-74.
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the development of the law of negligence and products liability
comes into play.
Negligence theory has evolved since Missouri ex rel Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,
particularly in the area of products liability. 165 Just seven years before
Southwestern Bell,166 Judge Benjamin Cardozo issued his famous
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.167 mounting the first
assault on the "citadel of privity."l 68 During the nineteenth century,
the rule of privity of contract governed most relations between buyers
and sellers.' 69 Privity meant that a seller was liable for defects in the
product sold only to the immediate purchaser with whom he had
contracted.170 The leading authority on privity was Winterbottom v.
Wright, an English case from 1842 in which the driver of a
stagecoach suffered an injury when a coach broke down and turned
over.17 1 The driver brought suit not against his employer, but against
the contractor who had agreed with the employer to supply the coach
and keep it in good repair.172 The court denied any recovery on the
ground that there was no "privity of contract" between the parties and
hence the contractor owed no duty of care to the driver.' 73
Subsequent cases carved exceptions to the rule, allowing recovery in
the absence of privity in certain special situations. For instance, in the
foundational case Thomas v. Winchester, a customer who purchased
a mislabeled bottle of poison from a druggist recovered damages
from the original seller who supplied the bottle to the druggist.174
165. See 262 U.S. 276 (1923); see generally OWEN, supra note 120, at 250-58.
166. 262 U.S. at 276.
167. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
168. Prosser, supra note 113, at 1099. I previously discussed the development of
the rule of privity in product liability cases in an article entitled Product Liability
and the Politics of Corporate Presence: Identity and Accountability in McPherson
v. Buick. See Jonathan Kahn, Product Liability and the Politics of Corporate
Presence: Identity and Accountability in McPherson v. Buick, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 3 (2001).
169. Prosser, supra note 113, at 1104.
170. Id.
171. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (L.R. Exch.) 404; 10 W & M 109. 109-10.
172. Id. at 403-04.
173. Id. at 406. For an analysis of Winterbottom v. Wright as a classic "no duty"
case see John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 1733, 1750-51 (1998).
174. 6 N.Y. 397, 397, 407 (N.Y. 1852).
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The court reasoned that inherently dangerous products, such as
poisons, demanded greater care in handling and foresight as to future
uses on the part of producers and sellers. 7 5
Under these limited conditions, liability for defectively
manufactured products remained largely confined to the arena of
contract law during the nineteenth century.176 A person harmed by a
product generally had legal recourse only against the person from
whom they had purchased the item. 17 In a localized economy
dominated by face-to-face market transactions this often meant that
the purchaser had recourse against the actual producer. Moreover, as
William Landes and Richard Posner have observed, most consumer
products of this era were "simple," in the sense that the consumer
could determine their quality relatively easily through simple
inspection. Landes and Posner contrast such "simple" goods with
"experience" and "credence" goods, which came to dominate
consumer markets in the twentieth century.1 79 "Experience goods
require use rather than merely touching or inspection to reveal their
qualities." 80 "Credence goods ... may not reveal their true attributes
even after substantial use."
Landes and Posner offer automobiles as an example of a typical
credence good.182 By the early twentieth century, automobiles were
175. Id. at 408-10.
176. See OwEN, supra note 120, at 250-51. See generally Prosser, supra note
113.
177. See Prosser, supra 113, at 1100, 1104. See also OWEN, supra note 120, at
250-52.
178. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 284 (1987). Landes and Posner give the example of a cantaloupe, whose
ripeness can be determined by squeezing, as one such "simple" product. Id.
Ironically, William Prosser earlier observed that "the extension of strict liability to
third persons with whom the seller had made no contract came after the turn of the
century . . . [in] the aftermath of a prolonged and violent national agitation over
defective food." Prosser, supra note 113, at 1104. Of course, this shift reflects the
industrialization of food production by such corporate giants as Armour and other
meat packers whose practices notoriously formed the model for Upton Sinclair's
muckraking novel, THE JUNGLE. See id. at 1105-06. This shows how food, a once
seemingly simple and accessible product can be rendered distant, complex, and
obscure through processes of industrialization in a national market economy.
179. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 178, 284-85
180. Id. at 284.
181. Id. at 284-85.
182. Id. at 284.
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being produced by large corporations and distributed nationally
through networks of intermediary dealers who were often distant
from the point of production. Indeed, the automobile also grew to
become perhaps the archetypical representation of modem consumer
society.'8 4
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., involved the collapse of a Buick
Model 10 automobile due to a defective wheel.1 85 Although Donald
MacPherson purchased the car from the Close Brothers dealership,
MacPherson instead chose to sue Buick for negligence.16 In his
opinion, Cardozo stated that the basic issue was "whether the
defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to anyone but the
immediate purchaser."' 87 Close Brothers was the immediate
purchaser and was hence in privity with Buick.'8 8 MacPherson was a
subsequent purchaser not in privity with Buick.189 There was no
doubt that MacPherson could sue Close Brothers, but allowing
MacPherson to trace liability back to Buick would have powerful and
far reaching consequences-especially in an increasingly national
market economy dominated by extended transactions where more and
more goods flowed across many miles and through many hands
before reaching their ultimate users. 190
Central to Cardozo's holding were the ideas of foreseeability and
inspection. Cardozo asserted that, "[i]f [the manufacturer] is
negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow."l91
Cardozo was also sensitive to changing social and technological
circumstances.192 Thus, in reviewing a variety of previous cases
183. See generally STEPHEN COONEY & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32883, U.S. AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: POLICY OVERVIEW AND
RECENT HISTORY (2005), http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05apr/
RL32883.pdf.
184. Id. at 1.
185. 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
186. Id. at 1051.
187. Id..
188. See id. at 1053.
189. Id. at 1051, 1053, 1055.
190. Id. at 1053-54.
191. See id. at 1053.
192. See id. ("Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit
the conditions of travel to-day. The principle . . . does not change, but the things
subject to principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing
civilization require them to be.")
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Cardozo distinguished Winterbottom v. Wrightl93 with the terse
assertion that "precedents drawn from the days of travel by
stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day."l 94 Just as the
new complex automobile of the 1910s was a "credence" good, where
the complexity of the product conferred on the consumer a reasonable
basis for relying upon the manufacturer to establish its soundness,' 95
so to an even greater degree must the modem ratepayer rely upon
utilities to establish the soundness of the decisions to construct
nuclear power plants.
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson was still relatively new and of
limited scope and influence when Southwestern Bell was decided.
Indeed, the following year, Cardozo noted that the "current"
established by MacPherson was "not uniform," and that "recent
decisions in Massachusetts have enforced the requirement of
privity."l 96 Even the eminent Harvard Professor of Law, Warren
Seavey in his effusive assessment of Cardozo's contribution to tort
law published in 1939, conceded that "it would not be true to say that
the case has been universally followed."l 97 Seavey concluded,
however, that "there is little doubt of the ultimate complete
acceptance of Cardozo's viewpoint."l98 Time proved Seavey
prescient. By 1960, William Prosser arrived at the conclusion that
"during the succeeding years, this decision [MacPherson v. Buick 199]
swept the country, and with the barely possible but highly unlikely
exceptions of Mississippi and Virginia, no American jurisdiction now
refuses to accept it."200
Three years after Prosser's article, the California Supreme Court
ushered in the modem era of products liability with Justice Robert
Traynor's opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.20 1
Traynor enunciated the rule that, "a manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
193. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (L.R. Exch.) 404; 10 W & M 109. 109-10.
194. 111 N.E. at 1053.
195. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 178, at 284-85.
196. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 78 (1924).
197. Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 372, 379 (1939).
198. Id.
199. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
200. Prosser, supra note 113 , at 1100.
201. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."202 Traynor went on to assert that
"the purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves." 203 The key point here is
the "powerlessness" of consumers. Like the consumers in
Greenman,204 ratepayers too are powerless with respect to the choice
of the product; they must buy electricity from the utility. Ratepayers
are also powerless with respect to decisions made to build new plants
which, if subsequently cancelled, might cause them significant
economic harm.205
In his trail blazing concurrence twenty years earlier in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 206 Traynor articulated four reasons for strict
product liability: "efficient compensation [loss spreading], efficient
deterrence, inferred negligence, and consumer expectations." 207
Building on Cardozo's approach in MacPherson,20 8 Traynor
emphasized that products liability law must keep pace with changing
social and technological developments:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its
great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship
between the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily
either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for
himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a
sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the
steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising
and marketing devices such as trade-marks. Consumers no longer
approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying on the
reputation of the manufacturer or the trade mark. Manufacturers have
sought to justify that faith by increasingly high standards of
inspection and a readiness to make good on defective products by
202. Id. at 900.
203. Id. at 901.
204. Id.
205. See discussion supra Part II and p. 28-29.
206. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
207. Wright, supra note 159, at 1067.
208. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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way of replacements and refunds. The manufacturer's obligation to
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between
them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has
become so complicated as to require one or more intermediaries.2 0 9
Thus, like the consumer of complex modem technological goods,
the ratepayer is not in a position to understand or investigate utility
decisions that will ultimately affect the product he or she receives.
Instead of relying on the reputation of the manufacturer, the ratepayer
must rely on the vigilance of the PUC to protect their interests.
Therefore, when it comes time to allocate the costs of cancelled
nuclear plant projects, the PUC should consider whether, as is done
in products liability cases, the party with the control over the product
and the decisions made relative to its production and marketing are
most appropriately situated to bear to costs of any harms caused by
those decisions.
In 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Torts largely adopted the
strict liability approach of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 10
Section 402A indicated that any seller of a product in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" was
strictly liable in tort for personal injury or property damage resulting
from that defective condition. 211 The question remained, however, as
to what constituted a "defective condition" that was "unreasonably
dangerous." The concepts were first implemented through a
"consumer expectations" test derived from Section 402A's comment
g, which stated that a product is defective if it is "in a condition not
contemplated by the consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him," 2 12 and the assertion in comment i, that a product
is unreasonably dangerous if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchase it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." 2 13
The "consumer expectations" test, however, had two basic
limitations. First, consumers are presumed to have no expectation of
209. 150 P.2d at 443 (citations omitted).
210. See 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A
cmt. a (1965).
211. Id. §402A(1).
212. Id. §402A cmt. g.
213. Id. §402A cmt. i; see also, Wright, supra note 159, at 1078.
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recovery when a product has open and obvious dangers.214 If such a
situation exists, the consumer cannot recover damages.215 Second, the
average consumer is assumed to have no reasonable expectation for
safety regarding complex "credence" products. 2 16  Thus, the
''consumer expectations" test soon came to be supplemented (and in
some instances eclipsed) by a risk/utility test. 2 17 The substance of this
test varies a bit form jurisdiction to jurisdiction but was given an
influential articulation in 1973 by John Wade as a seven-factor
balancing test.218  The "risk/utility" test calls for a seven-factor
balancing test. These factors include:
1. The usefulness and desirability of the product. [The
product's] utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
2. [The product's safety]-the likelihood that [the product]
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury.
3. The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
4. The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the [product's
unsafe characteristic] without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility;
5. The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
6. The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
7. The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance. 2 19
214. Wright, supra note 159, at 1079.
215. Id.
216. Id. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 178, at 284-85 (discussing credence
goods).
217. Wright, supra note 159, at 1079-80.
218. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
219. Id.
2010] 75
76 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWfREVIEW
Richard Wright argues that the risk/utility test is not simply an
"efficiency oriented" quantitative aggregation and balancing of
identified costs and benefits. 220 To the contrary, the "risk/utility" test
is a more qualitative and evaluative "consumer-oriented test which
conforms to the general test in negligence law for putting others at
risk." 221 Wright notes that:
According to this general test, the creation of significant
foreseeable risks to others is unreasonable unless the risks
are substantially outweighed by direct or indirect desired
benefits to those put at risk, cannot be reduced further
without loss of those desired benefits, are not too serious,
and are made known to those put at risk through proper
222
warnings.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability builds upon
Wade's seven-factor test, and states that a product "is defective in
design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe." 223 Wright notes that "the
words 'reasonable' and 'reasonably' in this definition are elaborated
through a 'risk/utility balancing' test,224 whose
[Relevant] factors include, among others, the magnitude
and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the
instructions and warnings accompanying the product, and
the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding
the product, including expectations arising from product
portrayal and marketing.... [T]he likely effects of the
alternative design on production costs; the effects of the
alternative design on product longevity, maintenance,
repair, and esthetics; and the range of consumer choice
among products are factors that may be taken into
220. Wright, supra note 159, at 1122.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1122-23.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
224. Wright, supra note 159, at 1084.
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account.... [E]vidence of the magnitude and probability of
foreseeable harm may be offset by evidence that the
proposed alternative design would reduce the efficiency
and utility of the product. . . . On the other hand, it is not a
[relevant] factor ... that the imposition of liability would
have a negative effect on corporate earnings or would
reduce employment in a given industry.225
These standards can guide future evaluations of the "prudence" of
investments of subsequently cancelled nuclear power plants. We can
use products liability law to inform and update the original prudent
investment standard articulated in Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri and given
force by Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 22
Foreseeability of risk remains central to both negligence and
products liability. The risk at issue is the risk of a nuclear power
plant's cancellation. The foreseeability of this risk should play a
major role in evaluating the reasonableness of a utility's decision to
embark on a nuclear power plant construction project.227 One way to
evaluate risk is to retrospectively analyze the outcomes of similar
actions in the past. For instance, the cancellation of 120 plants
between 1972 and 1990 provides one initial indication of past risk
that indicates a high likelihood of future cancellations.228
In order to use past cancellations as a guide to generally assessing
future risks, however, we must also consider the diverse factors
contributing to these cancellations. Among the most prominent of
these were: 1) the large cost overruns that plagued many plants; 229 2)
the fact that energy demand failed to keep pace with early forecasts in
the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the early to mid-1970s which
lead to both an increase in energy efficiency and a decrease in use;2 30
3) an increase in inflation that lead to high lending rates, which in
turn constrained the ability of utilities to support capital intensive
225. Id. at 1085 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b)
cmt. f (1998)).
226. See 262 U.S. 276, 289 fn. 1 (1924); 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
227. See supra text accompanying note 191.
228. Douglas Hearth et al., Nuclear power plant cancellations: sunk costs and
utility stock returns, 29 Q. J. Bus. & EcON. 102-03 (1990).
229. How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2.
230. Id.
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construction projects; 231 4) grassroots public opposition to nuclear
power grew to significant proportions as an off-shoot of the vigorous
environmental movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s;232 and 5)
the major accident at Pennsylvania's Three Miles Island nuclear
power plant in 1979 exacerbated all these above factors and led to
greater concerns for safety and more aggressive regulatory
oversight.233 A few of these factors, which are specific to the 1970s
and 1980s, seem unlikely to recur in that particular fashion. Inflation,
234for example, has been at historic lows for several years, energy use
forecasts are relatively conservative,235 and public opposition to
nuclear power has shifted largely toward support.236 Ironically, some
of same impulses toward environmentalism that led to such strong
popular opposition to nuclear power in the 1970s now support
nuclear energy as a low carbon alternative to fossil fuels that many
view as an essential component of a larger strategy to address the
threat of global climate change.237 Safety and reliability concerns
remain, however, as the Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS") has
stated that there have been more than forty-seven instances since
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.; See also Barasch v. Pa. P.U.C., 532 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 1987)
("[G]rowing political and regulatory uncertainties arising from the nuclear accident
at Three Mile Island, serious financial constraints of various [ ] members, and a
reduced need for additional future capacity."); Testimony of Peter A. Bradford on
Behalf of PCS Phosphate-White Springs, In re Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, No.
090009-El (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 15, 2009), available
at http://www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/09/07143-09/07143-09.pdf (regarding
the impact of cost overruns in spurring a consumer revolt against nuclear power
plant construction); Pierce, supra note 18, at 504-05 (discussing the impact of cost,
reliability and safety concerns on plant cancellations); Max Schulz, Three Mile
Island's Three-Decade Mark, CITY J. (March 26, 2009), http://www.city-
journal.org/2009/eonO326ms.html (discussing the impact of the accident at Three
Mile Island).
234. See, e.g. Annalyn Censky, CPI- Inflation rate stays uncomfortably low,
CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 15, 2010, 9:59 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/15/
news/economy/cpi inflation/index.htm
235. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2010 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035 ii (2010), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/
archive/aeol0/pdf/0383(2010).pdf.
236. GALLUP, supra note 17.
237. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, The Coming Nuclear Renaissance, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 29, 2009, at A9; McCutcheon, supra note 12.
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1979 in which nuclear reactors in the United States have been shut
238down for more than a year for safety reasons.
While some activist groups, such as the UCS, maintain strong
reservations about the environmental risk of nuclear power,239 some
of the clearest and strongest statements of significant foreseeable risk
concern finance. For example, a 2003 report from the Congressional
Budget Office evaluating the prospects for federal loan guarantees to
support the construction of new nuclear power plants considered "the
risk of default on such a loan guarantee to be very high - well above
50 percent." 240 The report states that
The key factor accounting for this risk is that we expect
that the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of
its high construction costs, relative to other electricity
generation sources. In addition, this project would have
significant technical risk because it would be the first of a
new generation of nuclear plants, as well as project delay
and interruption risk due to licensing and regulatory
proceedings. 24 1
Similarly, a 2009 Moody's Investor Services report noted that
"from a credit perspective, the risks of building new nuclear
generation are hard to ignore, entailing significantly higher business
and operating risk profiles, with construction risk, huge capital costs,
and continual shifts in national energy policy." 242 The report
characterized the new nuclear generation as a 'bet the farm'
endeavor for most companies, due to the size of the investment and
length of time needed to build a nuclear power facility." 243
Financially, the risks of constructing new nuclear power plants are
not only clearly foreseeable, but also substantial and significant.
238. Bob Herbert, Were Not Ready, N.Y. TIMES, July 19. 2010, at A23.
239. See generally How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2.
240. CONG. BUDGET OFF., CONG. BUDGET OFF. COST ESTIMATE S. 14 ENERGY
POLICY ACT OF 2003 10-11 (2003), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/42xx/
doc4206/sl4.pdf
241. Id. at 11.
242. MOODY'S GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., NEW NUCLEAR GENERATION:
RATINGS PRESSURE INCREASING 2 (2009), http://www.nukefreetexas.org/
down1oads/MoodysJune_2009.pdf.
243. Id. at 4.
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Indeed, if a standard manufacturer were to put a product on the
market with anywhere near a fifty percent chance of failure, courts
would be hard pressed not to find such a product defective.
Foreseeability, however, is only one aspect of product liability.244
The other critical component, particularly under the Restatement
Third of Torts (Product Liability), is the availability of a reasonable
alternative design.245 Such availability is particularly important in
relation to the first factor illustrated by Wade: an evaluation of "the
usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
,,246the public as a whole. Certainly, electricity is useful and
desirable. The issue then becomes whether we are speaking of the
value of generating electricity or the value of using nuclear plants to
generate electricity. If we focus on the latter, then the standard of
reasonable alternative design might be limited to designs for nuclear
power generation. In these terms, advocates of building new nuclear
power plants point to a new generation of reactors, which, they argue,
are cleaner, cheaper and more reliable.247
In January, 2010, President Obama called for "building a new
generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country."248 In a
recent report to Congress, the Department of Energy echoed the
President's enthusiasm, framing nuclear energy as a "key
component" of on-going efforts to "achieve energy security and
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction objectives."249
Conveniently omitting the Three Mile Island incident from its
calculations, the report asserted that "[t]he U.S. existing nuclear fleet
has a remarkable safety and performance record." 250 As for possible
new plant construction, the report noted that:
244. See OWEN, supra note 120, at 486-87, 495, 496 fn. 17. See generally id.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
246. Wade, supra note 218, at 837.
247. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 237, at A9; Ray Henry, Nuclear industry
takes new path for new plants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://www.google.com/search?q=Nuclear+industry+takes+new+path+for+new+pl
ants&ie=utf-8&oe utf-8&aq=t&rls-org.mozilla:en-US:official&client-firefox-a.
248. Timothy Gardner et al., Obama Eager to Help Advance Climate Bill,
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2010, 6:58 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE60ROME20100128.
249. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ROADMAP v (2010), http://nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/
NuclearEnergyRoadmap Final.pdf.
250. Id. at vi.
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During the 30-year hiatus from new plant orders in the
United States, some nations have continued to grow their
nuclear industries. As a result, some other countries have
advanced the state-of-the art in manufacturing of nuclear
plant components and have made progress in applying
more efficient construction techniques. The domestic
industry can learn from these international experiences. 25 1
Taking this cue, Atlanta-based Southern Power, Co. is looking to
adopt a new approach to nuclear power plant construction while
following an "off-the-shelf" strategy that looks to a few standardized
nuclear power plant designs as a basis for new construction, rather
than tailoring each plant to each locale.252 This strategy promises to
reduce costs and improve both reliability and safety.253 It also makes
nuclear power plants look more like the type of product typically
covered by products liability law: items manufactured according to a
standardized design. With a standardized design, the evaluation of
design defects becomes more viable. Southern Power picked the
Westinghouse Electric Co.'s AP1000 reactor from a group of
competitors that included GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy's ABWR
(Advanced Boiling Water Reactor) and the ESBWR (Economic
Simplified Boiling Water reactor), Areva's EPR (Evolutionary
Pressurized Reactor) and the US-APWR (Advanced Pressurized
254Water Reactor) from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Each company
claims its reactors are more efficient and economical than prior
designs.255 In particular, Jacques Besnainou, CEO of AREVA North
America, asserted that "safety was a selling point for his firm's EPR,
which has a system to catch and cool a molten core in the event of a
major accident." 256
These new nuclear reactors certainly seem to present reasonable
alternative designs to the old generation. Pursuing their construction,
therefore, might appear to be a prudent choice - certainly with
respect to older designs. Yet, these designs are not without their own
251. Id. at 22.
252. Henry, supra note 247(noting that this is the same construction project that
received eight billion dollars in loan guarantees from the Obama administration).
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Id.
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problems. The Areva EPR, in particular, "has been plagued by cost
overruns" in construction projects in Finland and France. 257 Cost
overruns in Finland alone are threatening to double the original
projected construction cost of $3.5 billion.258 Moreover, most of the
other projects for new generation nuclear reactors that have created a
recent increase in applications for licenses to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) have already been delayed or cancelled.259 An
estimated seventeen of nineteen applications currently submitted to
the NRC have run into design problems, cost increases, or a
260downgrading of utility bond ratings.
More importantly, however, is the consideration of a reasonable
alternative to electricity generation. After all, electricity is the
product that ratepayers are purchasing. Ratepayers have a secondary
interest in its source. It is important, however, to add one caveat: it is
reasonable to frame the issue not simply in terms of electricity, but in
terms of the production of electricity in a manner that promotes the
goals of energy security and greenhouse gas reduction.261 Framed in
these terms, it may be argued the reasonable alternatives to nuclear
energy are numerous, various, and viable. Prominent among these
would be similar investments in energy efficiency and renewable
energy projects such as solar, wind and geothermal.262 The
Environment America Research & Policy Center, estimates that:
The up-front capital investment required to build 100 new
nuclear reactors could prevent twice as much pollution over
the next 20 years if invested in energy efficiency and clean,
renewable energy instead. Taking into account the ongoing
257. Peter Behr, A Late Scramble to Fund 'Nuclear Renaissance' Kick-Start,
N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/07/30/30
climatewire-a-late-scramble-to-fund-nuclear-renaissance-83656.html.
258. Id.
259. Diana S. Powers, Nuclear Energy Loses Cost Advantage, N.Y. TIMES (July
26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/business/global/27iht-renuke.html.
260. Id.
261. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 249, at v, 47. See generally TRAVIS
MADSEN ET AL., ENv'T AM. RESEARCH & POL'Y CTR., GENERATING FAILURE: How
BUILDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WOULD SET AMERICA BACK IN THE RACE
AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING 7 (2009), http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/
assets/3962c378b66c4552624d09cbd8ebba02/Generating-Failure---Environment-
America---Web.pdf.
262. See MADSEN ET AL., supra note 261, at 3.
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costs of running the nuclear plants, a clean energy path
would deliver as much as five times more progress for the
money. 263
Lest these be dismissed as partisan assertions by an anti-nuclear
environmental group, it is worth noting that a 2009 report from
McKinsey & Company concluded,
Energy efficiency offers a vast, low-cost energy resource
for the US economy - but only if the nation can craft a
comprehensive and innovative approach to unlock it.
Significant and persistent barriers will need to be addressed
at multiple levels to stimulate demand for energy efficiency
and manage its delivery across more than 100 million
buildings and literally billions of devices. If executed at
scale, a holistic approach would yield gross energy savings
worth more than $1.2 trillion, well above the $520 billion
needed through 2020 for upfront investment in efficiency
measures (not including program costs). Such a program is
estimated to reduce end-use energy consumption in 2020
by 9.1 quadrillion BTUs, roughly 23 percent of projected
demand, potentially abating up to 1.1 gigatons of
greenhouse gases annually. 264
Moreover, while nuclear power plants continue to rise in cost and
face persistent cost-overruns, the price of solar energy has been
steadily declining.265 By one estimate, "solar photovoltaic power
should be comparable to a new nuclear reactor in terms of its per-
dollar ability to prevent global warming pollution" by 2018.266
Such claims may certainly be disputed. Surely they should not be
taken at face value without further investigation. What they do
provide, however, is a clear indication of the sort of questions that
263. Id. at 1.
264. GRANADE ET AL,, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY iii (2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/
clientservice/electricpowernaturalgas/downloads/us energyefficiencyfull report.
pdf
265. Powers, supra note 259.
266. MADSEN ET AL., supra note 261, at 3.
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must be asked as we go down the road to increasing the quantity of
nuclear power plants in America. If we were to confront future
disputes about the allocation of costs for the cancellation of plants
begun during this current potential nuclear renaissance, these claims
would also indicate factors that will need to be considered in
evaluating the "prudence" of the decision to commence such projects.
In deciding whether ratepayers should bear the burden of these costs,
PUCs employing the prudent investment standard should not simply
look to industry practice and apply an analogue of the business
judgment rule (this approach would remain appropriate for evaluating
shareholder suits against directors, because shareholders have a
choice about where to invest their dollars). Rather, they should
consider the analogy to products liability law and updated concepts
on negligence to evaluate whether there were reasonable alternatives
to generating electricity that presented lower risks. In evaluating the
reasonableness of the "design" of the decision to build a nuclear
plant, future PUCs might consider applying the Wade's seven factors
as revised and incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. 267 Let us then take each factor and consider it in
relation to the information presented above:
The Magnitude and Probability of the Foreseeable Risks ofHarm
If we conceive harm in terms of the economic harm of allocating
the costs of a cancelled nuclear power plant to ratepayers, then both
the magnitude and probability of foreseeable risks of harm are high.
Nuclear power plants cost billions of dollars,26 8 and the costs incurred
by plant cancellations are also likely to cost billions. 269  The
probability of harm is also likely and foreseeable. As noted above,
Moody's characterizes nuclear plant construction as a "bet the farm"
risk for utilities,270 and the CBO has estimated the likelihood of
default on guaranteed loans at over fifty percent.27' Projects proposed
267. See Wright, supra note 159, at 1081-82, 1085 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(TIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998)).
268. See MOODY'S GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., supra note 242, at 2, 5. See
generally MADSEN ET AL., supra note 261.
269. Douglas Hearth et al., Nuclear Power Plant Cancellations: Sun Costs and
Utility Stock Returns, 29 Q. J. Bus. & ECON. 102 (1990).
270. MOODY'S GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., supra note 242, at 2.
271. CBO, supra note 240, at 11.
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before the NRC are already running into problems, 272 and new
construction in Europe has experienced substantial cost overruns. 273
This factor clearly mitigates in favor of a finding of a "defect" in the
decision to build a subsequently cancelled nuclear plant, indicating a
want of prudence.
The Instructions and Warnings Accompanying the Product
The nuclear industry has largely touted the benefits of new plants
and downplayed the risks.274 The U.S. government is complicit here,
275
as evidenced by the DOE report overlooking past safety issues.
Nonetheless, by and large, nuclear energy is represented to
consumers as safe, efficient, economical and environmentally
sound.276 While warnings exist, they are not coming from the product
manufacturer. 277 This factor also mitigates in favor of a finding of a
"defect."
Consumer Expectations Regarding the Product, Including
Expectations Arising From Product Portrayal and Marketing
As evidenced by the recent Gallup Poll discussed above, public
278
support for nuclear energy is high. Consumers expect nuclear
energy to enhance energy security and address problems of global
climate change.279 In this regard, a cancelled plant does not
necessarily fail to meet such expectations. But consumers also expect
272. See Powers, supra note 259.
273. See Behr, supra note 257.
274. See Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n.,
What the National Energy Strategy Means for the Nuclear Power Industry,
Remarks at the Energy Investor Policy and Regulation Conference (Dec. 4, 2001),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/ 2 0 0 1/s01-
031.pdf
275. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 249; see also infra text
accompanying note 231.
276. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 249, at v-vi, 1, 9, 11-12, 34.
277. See, e.g., MADSEN ET AL., supra note 261, at 32; Henry, supra note 247;
Herbert, supra note 238; How Nuclear Power Works, supra note 2; Jacoby, supra
note 237, at A9.
278. See supra text accompanying note 17.
279. See generally JOSEPH A. STANISLAW, DELOITTE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
ENERGY SECURITY: THE FUTURE is Now (2007),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/
wicwClimate ChangeandSecurity_103007.pdf.
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nuclear power plants to produce electricity at a reasonable price.280 A
cancelled plant certainly fails in this regard.
The Likely Effects of the Alternative Design on Production Costs; and
The Effects of the Alternative Design on Product Longevity,
Maintenance, Repair, and Esthetics.28 1
This brings us back to the question of whether we are speaking of
alternative nuclear power plant designs or alternative designs for
meeting demands for electricity. If we are discussing the former,
then the concept of design defect is likely to fail; if the latter, then the
issue remains more open to contest. As discussed above, there are
very strong arguments that alternative approaches to meeting future
energy demands promise to be more efficient, economical, safer, and
more environmentally sound that nuclear power. 282 If the alternative
"design" is conceived not as another type of nuclear power plant but
as alternative modes of meeting future energy demand (such as
efficiency, solar, wind, and geothermal) then a strong argument can
be made that such alternatives are both preferable and viable
alternatives to nuclear power plant construction. If these arguments
come to pass, the choice not to pursue and implement such
"alternative designs" for meeting future energy needs could be found
unreasonable.
The Range of Consumer Choice among Products are Factors that
May Be Taken into Account
The consumer as ratepayer has virtually no choice among products
because it a captive to the regulated monopoly. 283 This consideration
weighed heavily in prior PUC decisions that analyzed the equities of
allocating plant cancellation costs under the "used and useful" test.2 84
Under this revised application of the "prudent investment" test, it
280. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
281. I will analyze #4 and #5 together because they both deal with issues of
alternative design.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 262-63.
283. Tomain, supra note 155, at 257.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 48 and 69-75; see generally Pierce,
supra note 18, at 512-13.
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would similarly weigh heavily in favor of allocating such costs to
utilities.
Evidence of the Magnitude and Probability ofForeseeable Harm
May Be Offset by Evidence that the Proposed Alternative Design
Would Reduce the Efficiency and Utility of the Product
This factor allows the utility to introduce evidence that alternative
modes of meeting future energy demands were not as safe, reliable,
economical or efficient as nuclear power.285 Strong arguments could
be made by pointing to the experience of other countries, such as
France, that have had large nuclear power programs contributing a
substantial share of their electricity needs for decades.286
IV. CONCLUSION
A flurry of costly, protected, and complex disputes concerning the
allocation of plant cancellation costs followed the collapse of the first
boom in nuclear power plant construction during the 1970s and
1980s.287 These cases led to divergent results that largely depended
upon the jurisdiction and the standards or review specific courts
applied. Such variation is almost always problematic and can
introduce jurisdictional concerns into utility decisions that should be
guided by basic considerations of appropriately meeting energy
demand. This article has aimed to take a step toward harmonizing
the "used and useful" test with the "prudent investment" test by
proposing that the latter can be updated through the pursuit of an
analogy to products liability law. By reconfiguring the concept of
"prudence" away from its analogy to the business judgment rule
toward products liability standards, this approach will provide a
means to both respect precedent in those jurisdictions applying the
"prudent investment" test and provide a more rational, consistent and
equitable basis for allocating the costs of future nuclear plant
cancellations.
285. Contra text accompanying note 282.
286. See Julie Schmit., U.S. Backs Loans for Nuclear Plants; Obama Says
They're Key to Cutting Greenhouse Gases, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2010 at IA.
287. See discussion supra Part II.
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